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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the effects of UK and EU subsidies on privately-funded R&D 
intensity of a sample of 39,730 UK firms. The sample consists of R&D-active firms 
surveyed in at least one year from 1998-2012. The results are obtained from 4 different 
estimators, with different degrees of control for selection and time-constant fixed effects: 
(i) pooled OLS without selection correction; (ii) fixed-effect (within-group) estimation 
without selection correction; (iii) pooled OLS with selection correction; and (iv) fixed-
effect estimation with selection correction. We report that UK subsidies are not 
associated with additionality in privately -funded R&D intensity in the full sample, and 
the additionality effect in manufacturing is too small to be conomically significant. In 
contrast, EU subsidy is associated with an additionality effect of 2% in both samples. 
Ordered-Heckman estimations of leverage indicate that an increase in UK subsidy 
intensity (subsidy/total R&D) is not likely to make a difference to private R&D effort in 
any of the subsidy intensity classes demarcated by 4 quartiles of the intensity 
distribution. However, an increase in EU subsidy intensity is associated with leverage in 
subsidy intensity class 3, which corresponds to subsidy intensity values within the 3rd 
quartile of the distribution.  
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UK and EU subsidies and private R&D investment: Is there input additionality? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Public support for business R&D is usually justified on the basis of market failures due to 
inappropriability of knowledge, increasing returns on R&D and R&D return uncertainty (Arrow, 
1962; 1996). To the extent that knowledge has a public good character, knowledge produced by 
a firm can spillover to other firms and deter the investor from undertaking the optimal level of 
R&D investment. In addition, information may be characterized by increasing returns to scale, 
conducive to very low marginal costs relative to average cost. For welfare maximisation, this 
property may require free provision of information but poses the serious issue of incentive 
compatibility in the production of information. Finally, R&D investment is associated with a high 
degree of uncertainty - not only with respect to success in generating new knowledge but also 
with respect to using the new knowledge in the production of new goods and services. For these 
reasons, governments have devised various schemes to provide direct or indirect support for 
R&D investments.  
 
Yet, the case for supporting R&D activities is not as straightforward as the neoclassical approach 
summarised above would suggest. From an evolutionary perspective, knowledge cannot be 
absorbed unless imitating firms invest in R&D in the first place (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). If 
this is the case, public support may lead to excess investment. Excess R&D investment can also 
occur when firms engage in ‘patent races’. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Dasgupta (1988), and 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) demonstrate that inter-firm competition for obtaining 
intellectual property protection may result in higher-than-optimum levels of R&D investment 
and part of that investment may entail sunk cost when the patent race is lost. Finally, the public 
good character of R&D may be overstated. A firm can use a wide range of tools to protect its 
inventions, including patents and secrecy (Nadiri, 1993). Therefore, the level of positive 
externalities may be low and⁄or industry-specific; and the case for supporting R&D activities 
may be less straightforward than it might appear in the first instance. 
 
These theoretical perspectives imply that direct public support for business R&D may or may 
not be effective in inducing firms either to undertake the optimal level of R&D investment or to 
create additionality on top of the public subsidy. Because of this ambiguity, a large volume of 
empirical work has been undertaken to find out how various public support schemes have 
affected firm behaviour with respect to R&D effort. A number of reviews of this literature exists. 
While Hall and Van Reenen (2000) review the literature on indirect support schemes, David, Hall 
and Toole (2000) review the literature on direct support schemes. More recently, Cerulli (2010) 
provides a review of the models and estimators widely used in the empirical literature.  
 
The aim of this study is to add to existing knowledge in three areas. First, we provide evidence 
on UK firms with a view to bridge the evidence gap on a country that have well-established 
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direct and indirect support mechanisms for business R&D. In 2009, the UK occupied the top 8th 
place among OECD countries ranked on the basis of direct and indirect support for business 
R&D as a percentage of GDP. This is lower than the United States (US) at the 5th place, but above 
Sweden, Norway and Germany the 11th, 13th and 18th place, respectively. Yet, and to the best of 
our knowledge, there has been no study investigating the consequences of UK support schemes 
for input additionality.1 Secondly, we control for selection in line with the existing literature, but 
we contribute to existing work by providing novel evidence based on a conditional mean 
approach that corrects for firm-specific effects in both the selection and outcome models. Third, 
we go beyond the current practice and demonstrate how the relationship between subsidy and 
the R&D effort differs between firms when the latters are divided into latent classes based on 
subsidy intensity (subsidy/privately-funded R&D).   
  
 
2. A brief review of the empirical literature 
Following the pioneering work by Blank and Stigler (1957), a large body of empirical work has 
utilised a variety of datasets and different estimation methods to ascertain whether public and 
private R&D investments are complementary or substitutes. The policy-relevant question is 
whether public support for R&D is associated with additionality or crowding-out effects on 
privately-funded R&D investment. The literature has evolved over time, starting with 
estimations of structural models without control for selection, going through structural models 
with selection and finally the emergence of matching models based on propensity scores 
(Cerulli, 2010). David et al. (2000) is an early review of the literature on direct public support 
schemes and private R&D effort. Given the time of publication, this review focuses mainly on 
studies that used structural models without control for selections. Out of 14 firm-level studies 
reviewed, only 4 used a selection equation or some instrumental variable (IV) estimator. In 
terms of findings, 3 studies report complementarity (additionality), 5 studies report 
substitution (crowding-out) effects, and the remaining 6 report mixed/heterogeneous findings 
driven by differences in the sample or model chosen.  The majority of the studies that reported 
crowding-out effects were based on US firm-level data. The reviewers conjecture that the 
relative lack of complementarity in the US data may be due to underlying differences between 
the US and continental European funding regimes.  
 
Later reviews also report mixed findings in the empirical literature. Drawing on a sample of 28 
studies that utilize firm-level data, Garcia-Quevedo (2004) reports that 7 studies find 
additionality, 10 studies find no significant subsidy effects and 11 find crowding-out effects. 
Dimos and Pugh (2014) is a meta-analysis study based on 52 studies published from 2000-
March 2013. With respect to 300 effect-size estimates from 27 studies where additionality and 
crowding-out effects can be separated, they report that 164 effect-size estimates indicate 
additionality whilst 136 estimates indicate no effect (117) or crowding out (19). Overall, the 
balance of evidence remains ambiguous.  
                                                          
1 We have identified only one study – a Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) analysis paper on output 
additionality (BIS, 2014). The only study on input additionality was Buxton (1975), based on industry data. 
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However, focusing mainly on recent studies that control for selection or utilise matching 
methods we observe an increase in the number of findings indicating additionality effects. For 
example, in their evaluation of the technology development funds in Latin America, Hall and 
Maffioli (2008) report strong evidence of additionality. Similary Czatrnitzki and Lopes-Bento 
(2012) also report additionality effect in Flanders, using the fourth Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS4) and matching methodology. Other studies in the area input additionality include 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) who report a additionality findings with respect to R&D 
intensity of German firms; Hussinger (2008) who uses semi-parametric selection models and 
report additionality among German firms; Duguet (2004) who report a similar finding for R&D 
intensity of French fimrs; and and Aerts and Schmidt (2008) who utilise a conditional 
difference-in-difference estimator for repeated cross-section data and report a positive 
treatment effect on firm R&D effort in Germany and Flanders. All of these studies reject total 
crowding out, but they also report evidence of partial crowding out.  
 
What emerges from these recent studies is an evident clustering of the additionality findings 
with respect to firm-level data from a few continental European countries (mainly Germany and 
Flanders). This raises the issue of data overlap and dependence between findings cannot be 
ruled out. However, it also raises the issue identified by David, Hall and Toole (2000) – namely 
whether the funding regimes in these countries are different and more conducive to 
additionality compared to others. Addressing these issues are beyond the scope of this study, 
but they reinforce the need to add to the evidence base by investigating the effects of subsidies 
in a country that has not featured in the literature over the last couple of decades. 
 
 
3. Funding regime, data and method 
 
Business expenditure on research and development (BERD) in the UK is relatively low 
compared to other OECD countries, even after adjusting for inter-country structural differences. 
Another feature of the UK BERD landscape is that R&D activity tends to be concentrated in terms 
of size as well as technology classes (Hughes and Mina, 2012).  Direct and indirect public support 
for business R&D is around 0.16 per cent of GDP and this is higher than most other OECD 
countries, excluding the US, Korea, Canada and France. Whilst the US relies more heavily on 
direct support, the UK government relies on both direct and indirect support with equal 
measures (National Audit office, 2013).  
 
Direct public support for business R&D includes funding from (or originating within) UK 
government departments, their agencies and non-departmental public bodies (e.g. Technology 
Strategy Board or its successor, Innovate UK). Given this landscape, different selection criteria 
may have been used during our estimation period from 1998-2012 – partly due to multiplicity 
of funding bodies and the change in the rules over time. Therefore, we do not have a clearly-
defined set of funding rules that can be used to model the selection of firms for direct support. 
Instead, we rely on the funding rules used by Innovate UK as a prototype that we assume to be 
representative  over the estimation period.  
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Innovate UK is a public agency that reports to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS), but operates at arm's length from the UK Government. It provides funding for business-
led projects with the objective of stimulating R&D and innovation activity, and encouraging the 
development of innovative products, processes and services with future commercial potential. 
All business entities (excluding research organisations, charities and public sector 
organisations) are eligible to apply for funding. Part-funding by the agency depends on firm size 
and type project, as indicated in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Funding rates as percentage of eligible project costs – Innovate UK 2014 
Applicant firm size Fundamental 
research 
Feasibility 
studies 
Industrial 
research 
Experimental 
development 
Micro (<10 employees) OR 
Small (<50 employees) 
100% 70% 60% 35% 
Medium (<250 employees) 100% 60% 60% 35% 
Large (250+ employees) 100% 50% 50% 25% 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/innovate-uk  
 
Fundamental research is eligible for full project cost funding irrespective of the firm size. It is 
defined as “theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge … without any 
direct practical application or use in view.” For all other research types small and medium-sized 
firms are eligible for somewhat higher funding rates - usually 10% more of the project cost 
compared to large firms.  Industrial research is funded at a rate of 60 and 50 percent of the 
project cost for SMEs and large firms, respectively. It is defined as “investigation aimed at the 
acquisition of new knowledge and skills for developing new products, processes or services or 
for bringing about a significant improvement in existing products, processes or services.” 
Experimental development research is funded at lower rates (35/25 split) as it is closer to 
imitation and rather than innovation. It is defined as the acquiring, combining or using of 
existing knowledge for the purpose of planning for new, altered or improved products, 
processes or services. Finally, technical feasibility studies are funded at relatively higher rates 
for micro businesses and are defined as research to analyse and evaluate the potential of a new 
project. Feasibility studies are expected primarily to assist firms to work, either individually or 
collaboratively, with other industrial or research organisations on Research & Development 
that requires an initial study prior to a subsequent and larger R&D project. Given these rules, 
firms can apply for part-funding at or below the indicated rates and indicating the composition 
of the total project along the four types of research indicated above. The agency decides on 
whether to fund and the amount of part funding, taking into account the project documentation 
and other information about the applicant. 
As far as eligibility and funding rules are concerned, the regime is transparent. However, 
Innovate UK does not publish information about how they set funding priorities - with the 
exception of references to policy documents published by BIS. In addition, the Business 
Research and Development Database (BERD) provides information on UK government funding 
received, but does not provide information on successful and unsuccessful applications. Another 
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area where public information is lacking concerns implementation monitoring. There may be 
an accounting-based audit process, but we do not know how Innovate UK ensures that part-
funding is spent in accordance with project objectives; and whether funding recipients are 
graded in terms of compliance with the conditions of the part-funding or on the basis of some 
performance indicators over the project life.  Absence of such information has important 
implications for modelling the selection decisions (see below).   
In this study, we use data from BERD – a repeated annual survey designed to measure R&D 
expenditure and employment in UK businesses. Throughout the estimation period (1998-2012), 
the BERD survey has been based on a random sample stratified by product group and 
employment size-bands. The sample itself is drawn from a sampling frame that consists of all 
firms known to be R&D-active through information from HMRC R&D Tax credit claimants, other 
sources of administrative data, community innovation surveys (CIS) and responses to a survey 
question about R&D activity in the Annual Business Survey (ABS).  As of 2011, the sampling 
frame consisted of 25, 511 firms.  
 
The stratified sample consists of about 400 large firms that account for about 80% of UK 
business R&D expenditures (sampled 1:1); size-band2-firms (100-399 employees) sampled 1:5 
and size-band3-firms (0-99 employees) sampled approximately at a rate of 1:20. The largest 
400 firms receive a long survey form, with detailed questions on R&D types (e.g., total, 
intramural, extramural, current, capital, basic, applied R&D) and sources of funding (e.g., 
privately-funded R&D, and public R&D support received from the UK government and the 
European Commission separately). Other firms receive a short survey form with questions on 
total, intramural and extramural R&D only. Despite the difference between the question sets, 
BERD reports detailed breakdown of R&D types, employment of R&D personnel and other 
related data for all firms. Missing data for smaller firms is imputed from third-party sources or 
estimated by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). (See ONS, 2012). Annual figures for total 
R&D expenditures and UK government support are given in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 indicates that BERD’s coverage has expanded steadily over time, with a total number of 
firms in the panel from 1998-2012 standing at 39,730. Firm appearance in the dataset ranges 
from 1-15 years. Subsidy intensity (direct government support as percentage of total R&D) has 
fallen form around 10% in 1998 to 7% in 2012.  
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Table 2: Total R&D expenditures and UK government subsidies: 1998-2012 (£ mn.) 
(Source BERD Database) 
Year 
Number of 
firms 
(enterprises) 
Total R&D 
(£ mn.) 
Central-
government-funded 
R&D (£ mn.) 
Support 
intensity 
(%) 
1998 8,350 10900 1048.834 9.62 
1999 7,678 11600 1133.149 9.77 
2000 8,630 11800 950.585 8.06 
2001 8,656 12200 742.585 6.09 
2002 10,930 12900 805.517 6.24 
2003 8,926 11900 975.956 8.20 
2004 11,752 14500 1312.154 9.05 
2005 12,969 15600 1125.116 7.21 
2006 16,849 16600 1042.328 6.28 
2007 19,911 18300 1039.612 5.68 
2008 16,970 19300 1040.349 5.39 
2009 19,046 18900 1288.505 6.82 
2010 18,592 19500 1383.028 7.09 
2011 20,556 20500 1488.232 7.26 
2012 22,169 20100 1338.957 6.66 
Total 
firm/year 
observation 
39,730 2.35E+08 16714909 7.12 
 
Table 3 below presents the summary statistics for the estimation sample, including all relevant 
variables.  The table reports summary statistics for firm/year observations when UK subsidy is 
and is NOT received.2  
 
The first observation to make is that the UK government support regime is highly generous: UK 
firms have received government support in 92% [(=195,151/(195,151+16,429)] of the 
                                                          
2 Minimum and maximum values are excluded to comply with non-disclosure requirements of the data host. We 
do not provide a similar table for cases when EU subsidy is and is NOT received to save space.  
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firm/year observations. The average UK subsidy intensity is 0.07 (7%), with a third-quartile 
value of 9% and a 95th-percentile value of 28%. In other words, the UK regime provides close- 
Table 3: Summary statistics – 1998-2012 
 
   Firm/year observation when                     Firm/year observation when 
UK subsidy is received                     UK subsidy is NOT received 
 Observation Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
UK subsidy dummy 195,151 1.00 0.00 16,429 0.00 0.00 
EU subsidy dummy 195,151 0.80 0.40 16,429 0.14 0.35 
Privately funded R&D (£'000) 195,138 556.20 15424.28 16,405 6.59E+03 4.63E+04 
Total R&D (£ '000) 195,151 638.56 16457.67 16,429 6.59E+03 4.62E+04 
Privately funded R&D intensity 193,730 0.80 36.23 16,039 1.40 32.99 
Total R&D intensity 193,742 0.90 37.56 16,063 1.40 32.98 
Deflated private R&D  195,138 622.19 16848.80 16,405 7.36E+03 5.04E+04 
Deflated total R&D 195,138 715.22 18037.17 16,428 7357.57 50361.51 
UK central government support 
(£'000) 195,151 78.51 2945.44 16,429 0.00 0.00 
EU support (£ '000) 195,138 3.81 126.87 16,405 6.74 202.00 
UK subsidy intensity 195,151 0.07 0.09 13,051 0.00 0.00 
EU subsidy intensity 195,138 0.01 0.03 13,050 0.02 0.06 
Multiple subsidy dummy 195,151 0.80 0.40 16,429 0.00 0.00 
Turnover (£ '000) 195,150 2.70E+04 4.15E+05 16,429 1.44E+05 1.05E+06 
Deflated turnover (£'000) 195,016 2.88E+04 4.81E+05 16,422 1.69E+05 1.29E+06 
Deflated turnover growth 187,038 0.02 0.67 15,594 0.03 0.69 
Age 195,151 16.71 10.39 16,429 18.81 10.30 
Employment (count) 195,150 146.12 1884.73 16,429 648.83 4828.83 
UK ownership dummy 195,151 0.88 0.33 16,429 0.78 0.41 
Herfindahl index (3-digit) 195,150 0.10 0.11 16,429 0.13 0.14 
Herfindahl index squared 195,150 0.02 0.06 16,429 0.04 0.09 
       
Capital R&D intensity 193,742 0.04 2.03 16,063 0.09 5.18 
Capital R&D int. Sq. 193,742 4.12 1006.27 16,063 26.83 2860.29 
       
R&D personnel (scientists and 
technicians) (count) 195,151 5.66 83.64 16,429 36.97 154.80 
Defence-related R&D activity 
dummy 195,151 0.59 0.49 16,429 0.24 0.42 
Pavitt class1 195,151 0.34 0.47 16,429 0.18 0.38 
Pavitt class2 195,151 0.22 0.42 16,429 0.11 0.31 
Pavitt class3 195,151 0.10 0.30 16,429 0.14 0.34 
Pavitt class4 195,151 0.28 0.45 16,429 0.43 0.50 
Pavitt class5 195,151 0.06 0.23 16,429 0.14 0.35 
Average effective real exchange 
rates 195,151 92.21 9.48 16,429 95.80 7.86 
Crisis dummy (=1 after 2007) 195,151 0.47 0.50 16,429 0.34 0.47 
Log (FTSE-100) 195,138 7.93 0.13 16,428 7.96 0.12 
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to-maximum levels of subsidy only to the top 5% of the successful applicants. The third 
observation is that the R&D intensity of subsidy-receiving firm/year observations (0.8) 
is lower than that of non-subsidized year/firm observations (1.4). However, the mean 
conceals a high degree of skewness as the respective median values are 0.03 and 0.01.  
 
Table 3 also indicates that non-subsidized firms are usually larger and older; and have 
higher level of R&D investment in R&D-related capital such as lab equipment and 
buildings. Non-subsidized firm/year observations are also associated with higher levels 
R&D personnel on average. Finally, more than one-third (36%) of the R&D-active firms 
in the UK are in the science-based Pavitt technology class – Pavitt 1 that includes 
industries such as chemicals, information technology, office machinery, precision 
instruments, and medical and optical instruments industries.  
We use this estimation sample and a structural model with selection to estimate the 
effects of both UK and European Union (EU) subsidies on privately-funded R&D 
investment. Subsidy is endogenous because it depends on the decisions of the firms to 
apply for UK and/or EU funding and on the decisions of the UK/EU to grant support to 
successful applicants. 
First-generation structural models (Lichtenberg, 1987) build on a demand and supply 
framework compatible with profit maximization, but they treat the subsidy as exogenous. 
Even they relax the assumption of exogenous subsidy, all they can do is to use 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques such as three-stage least-squares (3SLS) (Wallsten, 
2000). The 3SLS estimator allows for correlation between the error terms of the selection 
and outcome equations, but the exogeneity of the instrument for subsidy is non-testable 
because the model is just-identified. Hence the 3SLS approach benefits from theory-
driven outcome model inherited from the structural models, but it still does not address 
the issue subsidy endogeneity satisfactorily.  
Endogeneity of the subsidy may be due to three reasons. First, the firm’s R&D effort and 
the level of subsidy granted may be determined simultaneously. In other words, the 
decision of the funding agency may be dependent on the firm’s R&D effort. If the funding 
agency selects firms on perceived R&D effort, the OLS estimate for subsidy’s effect on 
R&D effort will be biased upward. Otherwise, the OLS estimate will be biased downward 
(Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002; Cerulli, 2010). Secondly, endogeneity may be due to 
ommitted variable bias that arises when the researcher does not have the necessary 
information about crucial variables (e.g., project quality) that affect subsidy. Finally, the 
data may be subject to measurement error, leading to correlation between the error term 
and the regressors.  
The ‘structural model with selection’ or the ‘endogenous binary selection model’ we 
adopt here can address the issue of subsidy endogeneity satisfactorily, provided that the 
error terms of R&D effort and selection models are distributed normally. In what follows, 
we draw on Busom (2000) and Takalo et al (2013) to specify the binary selection model.   
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Let F* denotes the unobserved net profit of the firm, Z the vector of observable variables 
that determine net profit, and u the error term. Then the firm’s net profit function can be 
stated as follows: 
𝐹∗ = 𝑓(𝐙, 𝑢)         (1) 
Firm’s decision to apply for subsidy or abstain depends on F*. The firm decides to apply 
if profits net of application costs are positive. Otherwise it abstains - as stated below. 
𝐼𝑓 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ < 0
        (2) 
The funding agency’s behaviour is modelled analogously, with G* denoting the objective 
function of the agency, W is the vector of observable factors that affect the agency 
decision, and v the error term.  
𝐺∗ = 𝑔(𝐖, 𝑢)         (3) 
Firm’s decision to apply for subsidy or abstain depends on F*. The firm decides to apply 
if profits net of application costs are positive. Otherwise it abstains - as stated below. 
𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐺∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐺∗ < 0
        (4) 
In the data, we do not observe the firm’s and the agency’s decisions separately. Instead, 
we observe the final outcome of granting or not granting of (hence obtaining and not 
obtaining) the subsidy. Denoting this outcome by I, we can write: 
 𝐼 = 𝐼𝑓 . 𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹∗ ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺∗ ≥ 0
0                      𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (5a) 
 
Using the equivalents of F* and G* from (2) and (4), we can re-write (5a) as follows: 
𝐼 = 𝐼𝑓 . 𝐼𝑔 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ(𝐙,𝐖, 𝑢, 𝑣) ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ(𝐙,𝐖, 𝑢, 𝑣) < 0
      (5b) 
Here h(.) is a function of observables in Z and W, and of the error terms u and v. 
Now let’s specify the firm’s behavioural equation (i.e., the R&D outcome equation) as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷 =  𝜇 + 𝐗𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼 + 𝜀       (6) 
 
Here, RD is observed only for firms participating in the public funding competition (when 
I = 1) or only for non-participants (when I = 0). In other words, ‘non-participants’ are the 
basis for the estimation of the participants’ unobservable counterfactual. Combining (5b) 
and (6), letting Q = [Z, W], and denoting firms with subscript i,  the system of equations 
for estimation becomes:  
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{
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝐗𝒊𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐼𝑖
∗ =  𝜃 + 𝐐𝑖𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖
𝐼𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗ ≥ 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗ < 0
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) =  𝜌 ≠ 0
       (7) 
 
 
Compared with matching or OLS models that assume selection on observables, model (7) 
has the advantage of taking into account the effect of unobservables. This is done by 
assuming non-zero correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection 
equations – i.e., by assuming that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) =  𝜌 ≠ 0. This assumption, however, is not 
sufficient for consistent estimation if some unobservables affect both the firm’s R&D 
effort and its treatment status (receipt or non-receipt of subsidy) simultaneously. This is 
the case because we condition the selection and outcome equations only on a set of 
observable covariates (X and Q).  
 
Reverting to IV techniques may be appropriate – but at the expense of not being able to 
test for the exogeneity of the instrument for subsidy. This is the case unless we have more 
than one instrument. The problem here is that it is already difficult to find one valid 
instrument in the kind of data available in this research filed. The good news is that the 
endogenous binary selection model provides a way out because it is a non-linear system 
– i.e., it consists of binary selection equation estimated by probit and an outcome equation 
estimated by (pooled) OLS after taking account of the endogenous subsidy (Cerulli, 
2010). Another advantage of endogenous binary selection model is that it can be used 
with both binary and continuous subsidy variables if necessary. If the subsidy variable is 
continuous, the selection model can be estimated with a tobit estimator and the invesre-
Mills ratio from the tobit estimation can be added to the outcome model. 
The endogenous binary selection model in (7) can be estimated via two-step or maximum 
likelihood (ML) procedures. Both procedures assume joint normality for the error terms 
of the outcome and selection equations (εi and ei). Under joint normality, both estimators 
are similar in terms of efficiency. However, the ML estimator is relatively less efficient if 
the dual normality condition is violated (Cerulli, 2010). Therefore, we use the two-step 
estimator. Once estimated, the model yields consistent estimates for the subsidy 
coefficient (𝛾).  
 
In both models, the coefficient on subsidy (𝛾) is an indicator of the effect of public support 
on privately-funded R&D investments. However, it is not a precise estimate if the 
treatment is interacted with covariates in the outcome equation. To obtain the treatment 
effect when treatment is interacted with covariates in the outcome model, we need to 
take the expected value of the difference between the outcomes of treated and non-
treated firms and the covariates with which the treatment variable is interacted. 
Denoting the R&D effort of the treated firms with RD1i and that of the non-treated firms 
12 
 
with RD0i, and recalling that the R&D effort is a function of the covariates in vector X, we 
can write: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖) = 𝐸{𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖|𝐱𝒊, 𝜺𝟎𝒊, 𝜺𝟏𝒊)} 
          = 𝐸{𝐱𝑖(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾0)}        (8) 
 
The ATE in (8) is the average difference of the treatment potential outcomes and the 
control (non-treated) potential outcomes on the ‘whole’ population of both recipients and 
non-recipients of the public support. 
 
On the other hand, ATET is the average difference of the treatment potential outcomes 
and the control potential outcomes on the treated population. It is estimated in 
accordance with (9) below. 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖 | 𝐼𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸{𝐸(𝑅𝐷1𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷0𝑖 | 𝐱𝒊, 𝐰, 𝐼𝑖 = 1)} 
             = 𝐸 {𝐱𝑖(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾0) + (𝜌1𝜎1 − 𝜌0𝜎0)∅
(𝐰𝑖𝛽)
Φ(𝐰𝑖𝛽)
|  𝐼𝑖 = 1}   (9) 
 
Although the structural selection model (7) takes account of endogenous selection, it has 
two shortcomings. First, consistent estimation of the subsidy’s effect on R&D effort 
crucially depends on correct specification of the selection and outcome models. As 
indicated above, usually we do not have sufficient information about the funding regime. 
Even if we do, there is no commonly-agreed set of covariates that should enter the 
behavioural equation for the funding agency. The second problem is due to time-constant 
firm effects that may be due to systematic differences between firms that are not 
observed/measured in the data. Such firm effects may be due to differences in 
management quality or other path-dependent characteristics – which remain constant 
over time for each firm but vary across firms. If time-invariant effects exist and if they are 
correlated with the regressors, pooled OLS estimates from (7) will be biased. 
 
Wooldridge (1995) propose a conditional mean approach to correct for firm-specific 
effects in the selection and outcome models. The approach involves estimating inverse-
Mills ratios for each year of the time dimension. This involves estimation of T probit 
selection models, where T is the number of years over which the firms are observed. The 
model can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (outcome equation); and 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + z′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       (selection equation) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜂𝑖 , x
′
𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝑖 , z
′
𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0      (10) 
 
𝜂𝑖  and 𝜃𝑖  are unobserved firm-specific effects. The firm-specific effect in the outcome 
equation (𝜂𝑖) can be eliminated by using a fixed-effect (within-group) estimator. 
However, the firm-specific effect in the selection model (𝜃𝑖) cannot be eliminated with 
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the same method because the selection model is non-linear and estimated with a probit 
estimator. Wooldridge (1995) draws on Chamberlain’s conditional mean theorem and 
demonstrates that the unobserved 𝜃𝑖  can be substituted by inverse-Mills ratio obtained 
from T cross-section probit estimations. Then the outcome model to be estimated boils 
down to: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + x′𝑖𝑡𝛼 + 𝛾𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡     (11) 
 
Model (11) can be estimated consistently using a fixed-effect estimator. The coefficient 
on the intervention variable (𝛾) will be unbiased because its estimation takes account of 
the selection rule through inclusion of the inverse-Mills ratio and is carried out after 
eliminating the firm-specific effects (𝜂𝑖). However, and just as it was the case with respect 
to the endogenous binary selection model, the consistency of the estimate for the subsidy 
effect depends on correct specification of the selection and outcome equations. Given that 
correct model specification is essential for consistent estimates, we use the same set of 
covariates for the selection and outcome equations in both endogenous binary selection 
and conditional mean estimations. Then, the difference between the two can be 
interpreted as the bias that arises from failure to eliminate the firm-specific time-
constant effects in the estimation of the endogenous binary selection model.  
 
Given these methodological considerations, we will provide estimates based on different 
estimators. This is to verify if the ‘treatment effect’ (i.e., the effect of subsidy receipt on 
privately-funded R&D) differs between estimators, depending on whether they control 
for endogeneity of the subsidy and eliminate the time-constant firm effects. The results 
will include OLS and fixed-effect estimates not corrected for selection bias, followed by 
structural selection model estimations from (7) and selection-corrected fixed-effect 
estimates from (11). Given that we have a panel dataset, our preferred estimator is 
Wooldridge’s fixed-effect estimator, which corrects for endogeneity of the subsidy and is 
carried out after eliminating the time-constant firm effects.  
 
The estimations results will provide an indication of whether UK government or EU 
support has a complementary or substitution effect on firm’s private R&D intensity. 
Having established whether we observe a complementary or substitution effect, we will 
also check whether the effect of subsidy on R&D effort varies between firms with different 
levels of subsidy intensity. In other words, we will try to identify the class(es) of firms 
where subsidy intensity is more (or less) likely to leverage private R&D investment. This 
is an important issue given that the R&D intensity of UK firms has been and is still low in 
comparison to international standards (Hughes and Milna, 2012).  
 
To address this question, we use an ordered-probit selection model proposed by Chiburis 
and Lokshin (2007).  This model allows for sorting the firms into J+1 classes of 0, 1, 2, … 
J on the basis of an ordered-probit selection rule where the latent selection variable (zi*) 
is not observable but the categorical variable (zi) that depends on particular realisations 
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of the latent variable is observed in the data. Then, we can specify the selection rule as 
follows (Chiburis and Lokshin, 2007): 
 
𝑧∗ = 𝛽′𝑤𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  ;    and 
𝑧𝑖 = 
{
 
 
 
 
0  𝑖𝑓 − ∞ < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇1
1  𝑖𝑓     𝜇1 < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇2
2  𝑖𝑓     𝜇2 < 𝑧𝑖 < 𝜇3
.                                   
.                                   
J  𝑖𝑓     𝜇𝐽 < 𝑧𝑖 < ∞
        (12a) 
 
The latent selection variable refers to subsidy intensity. In other words, we assume that 
firms belong to different classes of subsidy intensity as a result of a two-way selection 
process that we do not observe: selection by the firm to apply for subsidy and selection 
the funding agency to award the successful applicant. Given this setting, the outcome 
(R&D effort) is a linear function of a set of covariates in xi and the coefficients (α0, … αj) 
vary between categorical classes of zi. Then, the R&D effort equation can be written as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 
{
 
 
 
 
𝛼′0x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖0  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 0
𝛼′1x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖1  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 1
𝛼′2x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖2  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 2
.                                   
.                                   
𝛼′𝐽x𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝐽  𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖 = 𝐽
       (12b) 
 
Here the categorical variable zi = 0 is the class of firms that do not receive subsidy in a 
particular year; and the remaining classes 1, … J are sorted on the basis of increasing 
subsidy intensity. The latter is defined as the ratio of UK or EU public support to total R&D 
expenditures, depending on which support scheme is investigated. The model in (12a) 
and (12b) can be estimated through a two-step procedure or via maximum likelihood 
(ML).  The necessary condition for consistent estimation of the model is the same as the 
selection model in (7) above: the error terms of the selection and outcome equations (ui 
and εi) must satisfy the condition of joint normality. The two-step procedure is more 
efficient than ML if normality condition is violated. Therefore, we estimate the model with 
a two-step consistent estimator.  
 
We define the subsidy intensity classes as follows: zi = 0 is the group consisting of 
firm/year observations when subsidy intensity is zero; zi = 1 is the group consisting of 
firm/year observations where subsidy intensity is greater than zero but less than or 
equal to the value at the first quartile; zi = 2 is the group consisting of firm/year 
observations where subsidy intensity is between the first-quartile and median values; zi 
= 3 is the group consisting of firm/year observations where subsidy intensity is between 
the median and third-quartile value; and zi = 4 is the group consisting of firm/year 
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observations where subsidy intensity is equal to or greater than the value at the third 
quartile.  
 
 
Results 
 
Given the methodological framework above, the selection and outcome models we 
estimate are as follows: 
𝑆𝑢𝑏_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑙
2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑅𝐷_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑙
2𝑅𝐷_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑙
2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10def _𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Selection equation) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣_𝑅𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛾𝑆𝑢𝑏_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡   𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙
2𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝑙
2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙
2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑢𝑘_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼9HI_sq𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡3𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼13𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑡4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼14𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑙𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼18𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Outcome equation) 
 
 
In the selection model, we assume that the funding agency selects applicants on the basis 
of certain firm characteristics, including size (a dummy that distinguish between SMEs 
with less than 250 employees); whether the firm is a startup (i.e., it is born in 1998 or 
thereafter); intensity of R&D investment in research labs and equipment and its square; 
number of R&D personnel (i.e., scientists and technicians) employed and its square; firm 
age and its square; number of employees and its square; growth rate of deflated turnover 
between year t-1 and t; whether the firm is engaged in defence-related R&D; and the 
firm’s membership of Pavitt technology classes. A prefix (l) indicates that the variable is 
in logs, a prefix (l2) indicates squared value of the logged variable, and a subscript (t-1) 
indicates that the variable is lagged one year. The lagged value is used as we assume that 
the funding agency examines the firm’s annual statements in its evaluation of the 
applications. The squared values (the quadratic terms) are included to establish whether 
the funding agency’s selection decisions change at different levels of the firm 
characteristic in question.   
 
Covariates in the selection model are chosen on the basis of information about funding 
criteria/priorities indicated in technology strategy documents published by BIS, various 
funding schemes/competitions publicised on the Innovate UK website, and from 
modelling work in the relevant literature. As indicated above, there is no commonly-
agreed set of covariates that should enter the selection model; and correct specification 
of the latter is necessary for consistent estimates. 
16 
 
 
A similar approach has been adopted in specifying the outcome model. The level of 
deflated output (turnover) and its square is included because they can be considered as 
proxies for the cash flow available to the firm. In the R&D investment literature, cash flow 
is usually reported to be a significant determinant of R&D investment (Brown et al., 2009; 
Hall et al., 1998). Age is also a frequently-cited determinant of R&D investment, with older 
firms reported to have lower innovation intensities (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004; 
Balasubramanian and Lee, 2008). There is also a long-standing debate about whether 
firm size and innovation intensity are related (see, Cohen et al., 1987; Shefer and Frenkel, 
2005; and Tsai and Wang, 2005). Concentration at 3-digit industry level is included in 
line with Schumpeterian models of competition and innovation (Aghion et al, 2005; 
Polder and Veldhuizen, 2012).  
 
Finally, we include dummies for Pavitt technology classes, treating the unclassified 
industries (Pavitt5) as the excluded category. Pavitt class 1 consists of firms in science-
based industries (e.g., chemicals, office machinery, precision, medical and optical 
instruments industries, ICT, etc.). Pavitt class 2 consists of industries that are specialized 
suppliers of technology or capital goods to other industries (e.g., mechanical engineering 
industries, manufacturers of electrical machinery, equipment hire&lease industries, and 
business services suppliers, etc.). Pavitt class 3 consists of scale-intensive industries such 
as pulp&paper, transport vehicles, mineral oil refining industries, financial 
intermediaries, etc.). Pavitt class 4 consists of technology-supplier-dominated industries 
such as textiles & clothing, food & drink, fabricated metals, etc.  
 
Table 4 below presents Probit estimation results for the selection model. The exclusion 
restriction is ensured by using a size dummy that features in the selection of both UK 
government and the European union funding rule. This dummy is equal 1 if the firm is 
classified as small-to-medium-sized (SME) in both regimes; and zero otherwise. This 
dummy is not included in the outcome models. When checked in conjunction with other 
covariates in the outcome model, the size dummy is not correlated with the private R&D 
intensity, which is the dependent variable. Hence, we are satisfied that the size dummy 
complies with the necessary condition for exclusion restriction.  
 
Comparing the UK and EU selection, we can see that both funding regimes exercise similar 
selection criteria – with few exceptions. Focusing on similarities, we observe that both 
regimes favour growth firms, firms with engagement in defence  R&D, and firms within 
Pavitt classes 1 -3 (i.e., sciences-based, specialized suppliers and scale-intensive firms). 
However, the probability of receiving UK subsidy is higher than that of receiving EU 
subsidies for growth firms and firm with engagement in defence R&D.  In contrast, and 
although both regimes favour firms in Pavitt class 1 – 3, the EU is more likely to grants 
subsidies to firms in these classes compared to the UK government.  
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Table 4: Probit estimation of the selection model 
(Dependent variable: Subsidy dummy) 
Regressor Description/measurement UK subsidy EU subsidy 
Size dummy =1 if firm employment < 250 0.116*** 0.0698*** 
  (0.0233) (0.0189) 
Start-up firm = 1 if new entrant 0.147*** -0.0866*** 
  (0.0144) (0.00923) 
Lagged Capital R&D int. Log (int. +1), lagged 1 year -0.379*** -0.224*** 
  (0.0815) (0.0657) 
Lagged Capital R&D int. sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year 0.0547** 0.0180 
  (0.0234) (0.0201) 
R&D personnel Log, lagged 1 year -0.126*** -0.106*** 
  (0.00445) (0.00337) 
R&D personel sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year -0.0452*** -0.0350*** 
  (0.000716) (0.000589) 
Growth Growth of deflated t/over 0.0176** 0.0144** 
  (0.00884) (0.00605) 
Employment Log, lagged 1 year -0.101*** -0.0229** 
  (0.0128) (0.00927) 
Employment sq. Log squared, lagged 1 year 0.0176*** 0.0133*** 
  (0.00151) (0.00120) 
Defense R&D active = 1 if firm engages in defense R&D 0.688*** 0.251*** 
  (0.0125) (0.00802) 
Pavitt class1 Science-based 0.671*** 1.784*** 
  (0.0246) (0.0177) 
Pavitt class2 Specialized supplier of tech. 0.598*** 1.278*** 
  (0.0252) (0.0167) 
Pavitt class3 Scale-intensive 0.233*** 0.841*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0177) 
Pavitt class4 Supplier-dominated 0.0245 0.168*** 
  (0.0211) (0.0153) 
Constant Constant 1.121*** -0.318*** 
  (0.0416) (0.0299) 
sigma  0.269 0.293 
Rho  0.827 0.796 
Lambda (sigma*Rho)  0.223*** 0.233*** 
  (0.00405) (0.00505) 
Observations  162733 162733 
Excluded category for Pavitt classes is class 5, which consists of un-classified industries 
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Another similarity concerns the U-shaped relationship between the probability of 
receiving subsidies and some firm characteristics such as intensity of capital R&D 
spending, number of R&D personnel (scientists and technicians) and size in terms of 
employment count. Even though both UK and US subsidy regimes favour SMEs (with a 
size dummy coefficient of (0.116 and 0.07, respectively), the probability of granting 
subsidy decreases when employment size increases from a low threshold. After the 
turning point, large firms are more likely to receive subsidies. A similar pattern is 
observable with respect to capital R&D intensity and number of R&D personnel 
employed. These findings indicate that both support regimes are more likely to provide 
support to firms at both ends of the relevant scale.  
 
There is only one firm characteristic with respect to which selection in both regimes 
diverges: start up companies. Whilst the UK regime is more likely to support start-ups, 
the EU regime is less likely to do so. 
 
The final observation on Table 4 relates to estimates of unobservable heterogeneity. The 
estimate Rho provides an indication about the correlation between the error terms in the 
selection and outcome equations. The positive value in the UK and EU regimes (0.827 and 
0.796, respectively) indicates that unobservable factors that raise R&D intensity are 
correlated positively with the unobservables that increase the probability of applying for 
and receiving a subsidy. Given that the correlation is high, it can be inferred that both UK 
and EU regimes are essentially picking up winners on the basis of some information that 
is not measured in the data. The high level of correlations between the unobservables 
also indicate that the estimates of the treatment (subsidy) effect will be biased upward in 
both pooled OLS and fixed-effect estimates that do not control for selection.  
 
On the other hand, sigma is an estimate of the standard deviation for the error term in 
the outcome equation. It indicates the extent of variation in the unobservables for both 
subsidized and non-subsidized groups.  
 
The second set of estimation results (Table 5) relate to the outcome equation and are 
based on four estimators: (1) pooled OLS with no selection correction; (2) fixed-effects 
with no selection correction; (3) pooled OLS with correction for selection on observable 
and unobservables; and fixed-effects with selection correction for observables and 
unobservables. The coefficient on the UK subsidy dummy is negative and significant in 3 
out 4 estimations, indicating that firms substitute the subsidy for privately-funded R&D. 
However, the first two results are biased upward since they do not take account of 
selection. The third does take account of selection and indicates a high level of crowding 
out, but it does not take account of firm-specific effects that may be correlated with the 
covariates. Therefore, we prefer the estimate from model (4), which indicate that 
subsidies do not have any effect on private R&D effort.  
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Table 5: Effect of UK subsidy on Private R&D intensity – full sample 
(Dependent variable: Log of Private R&D intensity)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK subsidy dummy -0.0442*** -0.0133*** -0.462*** 0.00284 
 (0.00629) (0.00413) (0.00808) (0.00466) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.437*** -0.517*** -0.433*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00847) (0.00139) (0.00972) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0215*** 0.0254*** 0.0210*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.000388) (0.000603) (0.000104) (0.000691) 
Log(Age) 0.0115* 0.137*** -0.00142 0.178*** 
 (0.00698) (0.0123) (0.00667) (0.0225) 
Log2(Age) -0.00848*** -0.0234*** -0.00688*** -0.0247*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00282) (0.00130) (0.00469) 
Log(Employment) 0.381*** 0.242*** 0.405*** 0.251*** 
 (0.00770) (0.00800) (0.00182) (0.00878) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0357*** -0.0240*** -0.0393*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.000789) (0.000948) (0.000237) (0.00103) 
UK ownership dummy -0.0119*** 0.00620* -0.00541*** 0.00676* 
 (0.00383) (0.00328) (0.00194) (0.00355) 
Herfindahl index 0.0696*** -0.0269 0.0820*** 0.0267 
 (0.0217) (0.0174) (0.0157) (0.0190) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0733** 0.0111 -0.0810*** -0.0484* 
 (0.0363) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0259) 
Pavitt class1 0.113*** 0.0285 0.147*** 0.0483** 
 (0.00990) (0.0200) (0.00918) (0.0233) 
Pavitt class2 0.0340*** -0.00803 0.0739*** 0.00938 
 (0.00777) (0.0166) (0.00789) (0.0187) 
Pavitt class3 0.0538*** 0.00637 0.0749*** 0.0136 
 (0.00782) (0.0170) (0.00769) (0.0189) 
Pavitt class4 0.00853 -0.00180 0.0303*** 0.000856 
 (0.00690) (0.0156) (0.00726) (0.0172) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.00316*** -0.00240*** -0.00306*** -0.00261*** 
 (0.000176) (0.000168) (0.000205) (0.000194) 
Crisis dummy -0.0222*** -0.0258*** -0.0138*** -0.0372*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00318) (0.00387) (0.00406) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.0506*** -0.0628*** -0.0385*** -0.0797*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00484) (0.00499) (0.00551) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.00254 0.00807*** -0.00382** 0.00380** 
 (0.00263) (0.00168) (0.00194) (0.00174) 
     
Inverse Mills - UK    0.0809*** 
    (0.00608) 
Constant 2.072*** 2.424*** 2.293*** 2.444*** 
 (0.0480) (0.0612) (0.0451) (0.0784) 
     
lambda   0.223**  
sigma   0.269 0.328 
rho   0.827 0.675 
Observation 209652 209652 162733 162733 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 below replicates the same set of estimations for EU subsidy. For the same reasons 
indicated above, we prefer the estimate from model (4). In contrast to UK subsidies, EU 
subsidies have an additionality effect as the coefficient on EU subsidy is positive and 
significant. This result suggests that the UK selection regime can learn from EU 
experience in order to leverage more private R&D effort from supported firms. 
Table 6: Effect of EU R&D subsidy on Private R&D intensity – full sample 
(Dependent variable: Log of Private R&D intensity) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU subsidy dummy 0.0314** 0.0128** -0.370*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0136) (0.00546) (0.0117) (0.00789) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.437*** -0.517*** -0.434*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00643) (0.00847) (0.00143) (0.00973) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0215*** 0.0254*** 0.0212*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.000387) (0.000603) (0.000106) (0.000693) 
Log(Age) 0.0119* 0.138*** 0.00433 0.204*** 
 (0.00700) (0.0123) (0.00673) (0.0225) 
Log2(Age) -0.00865*** -0.0240*** -0.00668*** -0.0344*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00279) (0.00131) (0.00460) 
Log(Employment) 0.381*** 0.242*** 0.404*** 0.249*** 
 (0.00767) (0.00799) (0.00193) (0.00877) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0356*** -0.0239*** -0.0385*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.000781) (0.000948) (0.000249) (0.00103) 
UK ownership dummy -0.0124*** 0.00626* -0.00599*** 0.00684* 
 (0.00388) (0.00328) (0.00196) (0.00357) 
Herfindahl index 0.0674*** -0.0273 0.0919*** 0.0289 
 (0.0216) (0.0175) (0.0157) (0.0191) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0705* 0.0119 -0.0916*** -0.0489* 
 (0.0360) (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0260) 
Pavitt class1 0.111*** 0.0282 0.313*** 0.0478** 
 (0.00990) (0.0200) (0.0101) (0.0233) 
Pavitt class2 0.0320*** -0.00802 0.208*** 0.00917 
 (0.00773) (0.0166) (0.00858) (0.0184) 
Pavitt class3 0.0516*** 0.00632 0.182*** 0.0167 
 (0.00780) (0.0170) (0.00811) (0.0187) 
Pavitt class4 0.00644 -0.00165 0.0560*** 0.00390 
 (0.00687) (0.0156) (0.00726) (0.0169) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.00290*** -0.00232*** -0.00244*** -0.00183*** 
 (0.000169) (0.000165) (0.000203) (0.000174) 
Crisis dummy -0.0197*** -0.0238*** -0.00701* -0.0171*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00300) (0.00388) (0.00341) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.0451*** -0.0609*** -0.0400*** -0.0609*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00474) (0.00501) (0.00531) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0470*** -0.00728 -0.0450*** -0.0149* 
 (0.0137) (0.00536) (0.00762) (0.00767) 
Inverse Mills - EU    0.0138*** 
    (0.00253) 
Constant 1.971*** 2.391*** 1.989*** 2.223*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0594) (0.0443) (0.0747) 
lambda   0.233  
sigma  0.332 0.293 0.330 
rho  0.657 0.796 0.677 
N 209652 209652 162733 162733 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix replicate the estimations in Tables 5 and 6, using data 
for firms in the manufacturing sector only.  Results from the preferred estimator (i.e., the 
fixed-effect estimator corrected for selection) also indicate an additionality effect in the 
case of EU subsidy: an effect of 0.0192 in manufacturing compared to 0.0207 in the full 
sample. There is also an additionality effect associated with UK subsidy in the 
manufacturing sector too; but the effect is much smaller (0.009). These findings indicate 
that when a firm switches from a non-subsidised to a subsidised status, its privately-
funded R&D intensity increases by 2% in the case of EU subsidy in the manufacturing 
sample or the full sample.  However UK subsidy has no effect in the full sample, and the 
additionality effect is less than 1% (0.9%) in the manufacturing sector. Overall, these 
findings indicate that the EU regime is more successful in leveraging additionality 
compared to the UK regime. 
 
Having estimated the effects of UK and EU subsidies on privately-funded R&D intensity, 
we have estimated the ordered-Heckman model (12a and 12b) with a view to identify the 
variation in the relationship between subsidy intensity and private R&D intensity. The 
results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 (for UK and EU subsidy intensity classes, 
respectively). The coefficient on the UK or EU subsidy intensity is an estimate of leverage 
– i.e., an estimate of the extent to which UK or EU funders can leverage additional private 
R&D effort if they increase the subsidy intensity by 1% in each class.   
 
Results in Table 7 below indicate that UK funders would be unable to leverage additional 
private R&D effort in any of the subsidy intensity classes. In fact, a 1% increase in UK 
subsidy intensity is associated with additional crowding-out effects of -1.732% in subsidy 
intensity class 2 and a crowding-out effect of -0.131% in intensity class 4. In contrast, an 
increase of 1% in EU subsidy intensity can leverage an additional private R&D intensity 
by 4.833% in subsidy intensity class 3. Nevertheless, an increase of 1% in EU subsidy 
intensity is associated with a high degree of crowding out (-18.46%) in subsidy intensity 
class 2. The results from both UK and EU subsidy intensity classes are consistent in the 
sense that subsidy intensity class 2 is the least likely to class for leveraging additional 
R&D effort by increasing the generosity of the subsidy granted.  
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Table 7: Ordered Heckman estimates for UK subsidy intensity classes: 
[Dependant variable: Log (Private R&D intensity + 1) 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Log(UK subsidy intensity + 1) -0.328 -1.702*** -0.0335 -0.131*** 
 (0.553) (0.304) (0.0666) (0.0161) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.401*** -0.485*** -0.401*** -0.523*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00266) (0.00247) (0.00281) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0194*** 0.0253*** 0.0212*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000210) (0.000191) (0.000251) 
Log(Age) -0.0228*** -0.0274*** -0.0288*** -0.0508*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00221) (0.00216) (0.00256) 
Log(Employment) 0.322*** 0.403*** 0.354*** 0.474*** 
 (0.00318) (0.00353) (0.00329) (0.00393) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0298*** -0.0418*** -0.0370*** -0.0479*** 
 (0.000386) (0.000463) (0.000437) (0.000554) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00646** 0.000542 -0.00111 0.00717 
 (0.00297) (0.00355) (0.00386) (0.00531) 
Herfindahl index -0.0619** -0.0300 0.0368 -0.0172 
 (0.0284) (0.0342) (0.0292) (0.0376) 
Herfindahl index sq. 0.124*** 0.0564 -0.0611 0.0399 
 (0.0452) (0.0565) (0.0455) (0.0642) 
Pavitt class1 0.130*** 0.106*** 0.0695*** 0.0388 
 (0.0159) (0.0201) (0.0244) (0.0513) 
Pavitt class2 0.0516*** 0.0243 0.0473*** 0.0255 
 (0.0159) (0.0178) (0.0122) (0.0214) 
Pavitt class3 0.0958*** 0.0281* 0.0517*** -0.00788 
 (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0137) (0.0227) 
Pavitt class4 0.0507*** 0.0174 0.0454*** 0.0421** 
 (0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0171) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.000771** -0.000489 -0.00254*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.000339) (0.000689) (0.000546) (0.000548) 
Crisis dummy -0.0154*** -0.0253* -0.0335*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.00569) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Log(FTSE-100)  0.00565 0.0136 0.0606*** -0.110*** 
 (0.00819) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0132) 
Multiple subsidy dummy 0.00514 0.0142*** -0.0296*** 0.114*** 
 (0.00351) (0.00458) (0.00395) (0.00681) 
Constant 1.330*** 1.523*** 0.956*** 3.387*** 
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.0789) (0.119) 
lambda 0.0191*** 0.0273*** -0.00473 0.116*** 
 (0.00449) (0.00541) (0.00616) (0.00905) 
Observation 161829 161829 161829 161829 
Categorical class with 0 (zero) subsidy intensity is excluded. Class 1 is consists of firm/year observations 
where subsidy intensity is greater than zero but less than or equal to the value at the first quartile; Class 2 
refers to subsidy intensity between the first-quartile and median values; Class 3 refers to subsidy intensity 
between the median and third-quartile value; and Class 4 refers to subsidy intensity equal to or greater 
than the value at the third quartile.  
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Table 8: Ordered Heckman estimates for EU subsidy intensity classes: 
[Dependant variable: Log (Private R&D intensity + 1)] 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Log (EU subsidy intensity + 1) -0.635 -18.46*** 4.833*** -0.736*** 
 (3.672) (1.925) (0.545) (0.0470) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.430*** -0.349*** -0.486*** -0.610*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00259) (0.00313) (0.00346) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0216*** 0.0175*** 0.0252*** 0.0321*** 
 (0.000190) (0.000194) (0.000253) (0.000342) 
Log(Age) -0.0240*** -0.0273*** -0.0421*** -0.0453*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00217) (0.00291) (0.00317) 
Log(Employment) 0.349*** 0.288*** 0.460*** 0.613*** 
 (0.00344) (0.00327) (0.00479) (0.00603) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0335*** -0.0279*** -0.0461*** -0.0615*** 
 (0.000397) (0.000413) (0.000604) (0.000786) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00428* -0.000629 0.00120 -0.0210*** 
 (0.00260) (0.00334) (0.00506) (0.00679) 
Herfindahl index -0.0362 0.0630** 0.588*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0302) (0.0447) (0.0433) 
Herfindahl index sq. 0.0790 -0.0471 -0.748*** 0.418*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0440) (0.0732) (0.0861) 
Pavitt class1 -0.0104 0.0369** -0.0539* 0.0795 
 (0.0272) (0.0171) (0.0292) (0.0822) 
Pavitt class2 -0.0445* 0.0333** -0.0697*** -0.00659 
 (0.0243) (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.0446) 
Pavitt class3 -0.0129 0.0463*** -0.00103 0.0270 
 (0.0235) (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0437) 
Pavitt class4 0.0306 0.0726*** 0.0270 0.0244 
 (0.0233) (0.0160) (0.0212) (0.0306) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate -0.000873** 0.00257*** -0.00289*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.000361) (0.000491) (0.000540) (0.00158) 
Crisis dummy -0.0140* 0.0303*** 0.0358*** -0.214*** 
 (0.00741) (0.00867) (0.0107) (0.0316) 
Log(FTSE-100)  0.00699 -0.0542*** -0.0783*** -0.0669*** 
 (0.00843) (0.00884) (0.0156) (0.0152) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0656*** -0.123*** -0.210*** -0.123*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0146) (0.0230) (0.0168) 
Constant 1.401*** 1.469*** 2.573*** 5.159*** 
 (0.0975) (0.0698) (0.135) (0.220) 
lambda -0.0960*** -0.0363*** -0.0969*** -0.0626*** 
 (0.00718) (0.00548) (0.0113) (0.0173) 
Observation 161829 161829 161829 161829 
 
So far, we have interpreted the results with respect to the relationship between subsidy 
and private R&D effort only. However, our estimation results indicate that private R&D 
intensity is also related to wide range of other firm-level, industry-level and 
macroeconomic variables. Results from the full sample and from the manufacturing 
sample depict a consistent picture with respect to the effects of these covariates. Whilst 
turnover (as a proxy for cash flow) has a U-shaped relationship with R&D intensity; age 
and size (measured by employment headcount) and market concentration all have an 
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inverted-U relationship. In the case of industry-level factors, we observe that private 
R&D intensity is consistently higher in Pavitt technology classes 1 – 3 compared to the 
excluded category of unclassified technology class. Finally, private R&D intensity is 
lower during the post-crisis period (2008-2012), when the currency experiences real 
appreciation, and the FTSE-100 index increases. (These findings and their relationships 
with the existing literature will be discussed later. 
 
Conclusions 
We have investigated the effects of UK and EU subsidies on privately-funded R&D 
intensity of a sample of about 22,000 UK firms. The sample consists of R&D-active firms 
surveyed in at least one year from 1998-2012. The results are obtained from 4 different 
estimators, with different degrees of control for selection and time-constant fixed effects: 
(i) pooled OLS without selection correction; (ii) fixed-effect (within-group) estimation 
without selection correction; (iii) pooled OLS with selection correction; and (iv) fixed-
effect estimation with selection correction. We report that UK subsidies are not 
associated with additionality in privately -funded R&D intensity in the full sample, and 
the additionality effect in manufacturing is too small to be conomically significant. In 
contrast, EU subsidy is associated with an additionality effect of 2% in both samples. 
Ordered-Heckman estimations of leverage indicate that an increase in UK subsidy 
intensity (subsidy/total R&D) is not likely to make a difference to private R&D effort in 
any of the subsidy intensity classes demarcated by 4 quartiles of the subsidy intensity of 
the distribution. However, an increase in EU subsidy intensity is associated with leverage 
in subsidy intensity class 3, which corresponds to intensity values within the 3rd quartile 
of the distribution.  
 
Estimation results also indicate that private R&D intensity is related to wide range of 
other firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic variables. Results from the full 
sample and from the manufacturing sample depict a consistent picture with respect to 
the effects of these covariates. Whilst turnover (as a proxy for cash flow) has a U-shaped 
relationship with R&D intensity; age and size (measured by employment headcount) 
and market concentration all have an inverted-U relationship. In the case of industry-
level factors, we observe that private R&D intensity is consistently higher in Pavitt 
technology classes 1 – 3 compared to the excluded category of unclassified technology 
class. Finally, private R&D intensity is lower during the post-crisis period (2008-2012), 
when the currency experiences real appreciation, and the FTSE-100 index increases.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: UK subsidy and privately-funded R&D effort – Manufacturing. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UK_sub_dum -0.00339 0.00578** -0.171*** 0.00880*** 
 (0.00332) (0.00241) (0.00827) (0.00242) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.309*** -0.391*** -0.288*** -0.374*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0300) (0.00192) (0.0336) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0145*** 0.0176*** 0.0134*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.000920) (0.00173) (0.000125) (0.00196) 
Log(Age) -0.0604*** -0.0142 -0.0643*** -0.0187 
 (0.0152) (0.0321) (0.00823) (0.0467) 
Log2(Age) 0.00765*** 0.00648 0.00834*** 0.00913 
 (0.00262) (0.00610) (0.00149) (0.00887) 
Log(Employment) 0.231*** 0.154*** 0.226*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.00213) (0.0152) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0201*** -0.0123*** -0.0200*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.000253) (0.00172) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00415* 0.0000595 -0.00318** 0.00178 
 (0.00239) (0.00250) (0.00147) (0.00236) 
Herfindahl index 0.0179 -0.0123 0.0136 -0.00981 
 (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0160) (0.0196) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0253 0.00203 -0.00543 -0.00550 
 (0.0328) (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0328) 
Pavitt class1 0.0844*** 0.0227 0.114*** -0.0115 
 (0.0127) (0.0269) (0.00974) (0.0185) 
Pavitt class2 0.0594*** 0.0152 0.0842*** -0.0106 
 (0.0114) (0.0249) (0.00935) (0.0148) 
Pavitt class3 0.0824*** 0.0277 0.100*** -0.00437 
 (0.0108) (0.0246) (0.00894) (0.0142) 
Pavitt class4 0.0321*** 0.0163 0.0519*** -0.00890 
 (0.00951) (0.0232) (0.00892) (0.0108) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate 0.000267 0.000420*** 0.000599*** -0.0000322 
 (0.000190) (0.000159) (0.000187) (0.000165) 
Crisis dummy 0.0144*** 0.00853*** 0.0191*** -0.00378 
 (0.00362) (0.00304) (0.00351) (0.00374) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.00449 -0.00547 -0.00368 -0.0112*** 
 (0.00447) (0.00407) (0.00422) (0.00424) 
Multiple subsidy dummy 0.00497** 0.00605*** 0.00648*** 0.00490*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00152) (0.00164) (0.00158) 
Inverse Mills - UK    0.0225*** 
    (0.00447) 
Constant 1.028*** 1.574*** 1.096*** 1.603*** 
 (0.0585) (0.113) (0.0376) (0.132) 
Observation 82628 82628 68091 68091 
lambda   0.0888  
sigma  0.221 0.147 0.204 
rho  0.744 0.605 0.739 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A2: EU subsidy and privately-funded R&D effort – Manufacturing. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU subsidy dummy 0.0152* 0.0106 -0.0637*** 0.0192** 
 (0.00814) (0.00871) (0.00930) (0.00805) 
Log (Deflated turnover) -0.309*** -0.391*** -0.289*** -0.374*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0300) (0.00192) (0.0336) 
Log(Def. turnover sq.) 0.0146*** 0.0176*** 0.0135*** 0.0167*** 
 (0.000920) (0.00173) (0.000126) (0.00195) 
Log(Age) -0.0603*** -0.0160 -0.0580*** -0.0101 
 (0.0152) (0.0320) (0.00821) (0.0461) 
Log2(Age) 0.00764*** 0.00711 0.00750*** 0.00636 
 (0.00262) (0.00608) (0.00148) (0.00861) 
Log(Employment) 0.232*** 0.154*** 0.225*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0133) (0.00214) (0.0152) 
Log2(Employment) -0.0201*** -0.0123*** -0.0197*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00148) (0.000253) (0.00172) 
UK ownership dummy -0.00416* 0.000000540 -0.00302** 0.00168 
 (0.00239) (0.00250) (0.00148) (0.00237) 
Herfindahl index 0.0178 -0.0119 0.0193 -0.0103 
 (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0161) (0.0197) 
Herfindahl index sq. -0.0251 0.00253 -0.0163 -0.00479 
 (0.0329) (0.0304) (0.0324) (0.0329) 
Pavitt class1 0.0844*** 0.0219 0.147*** -0.00450 
 (0.0127) (0.0268) (0.0104) (0.0184) 
Pavitt class2 0.0593*** 0.0144 0.121*** -0.00597 
 (0.0114) (0.0249) (0.0101) (0.0147) 
Pavitt class3 0.0824*** 0.0268 0.133*** 0.0000838 
 (0.0108) (0.0246) (0.00945) (0.0141) 
Pavitt class4 0.0320*** 0.0155 0.0752*** -0.00777 
 (0.00950) (0.0232) (0.00916) (0.0107) 
Aver. Real Eff. Exch. Rate 0.000318* 0.000345** 0.000380** 0.00000880 
 (0.000184) (0.000156) (0.000186) (0.000153) 
Crisis dummy 0.0154*** 0.00662** 0.0142*** -0.00301 
 (0.00354) (0.00283) (0.00349) (0.00318) 
Log(FTSE-100)  -0.00430 -0.00660 -0.00318 -0.000953 
 (0.00447) (0.00402) (0.00422) (0.00446) 
Multiple subsidy dummy -0.0109 -0.00279 -0.0110 -0.0110 
 (0.00819) (0.00845) (0.00709) (0.00792) 
Inverse Mills - EU    0.0129*** 
    (0.00275) 
     
Constant 1.016*** 1.595*** 0.974*** 1.513*** 
 (0.0584) (0.113) (0.0368) (0.124) 
Observation 82628 82628 68091 68091 
lambda   0.0474  
sigma  0.220 0.143 0.204 
rho  0.744 0.330 0.740 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations include 2-digit industry dummies. Time 
dummies are not included as the crisis dummy, the FTSE-100 and the average effective exchange rates capture 
time variation. (1) and (2) are pooled OLS and Fixed-effect without selection correction; (3) is pooled OLS with 
selection correction; and  (4) is FE with selection correction. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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